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The meat supply chain is traditionally a chain of independent production ￿rms where product moves
from one supplier to the next through open market transactions. Qualities, quantities and prices are
established through observation and negotiation. However, downstream parties often do not have
full information about food safety and food quality e⁄orts exerted in upstream stages of produc-
tion. Direct monitoring of production processes is prohibitively expensive in most cases. Moreover,
problems which occur at an upstream stage of production often manifest themselves in downstream
stages of production at which point the original supplier identity is lost. Some of the more prominent
issues include toxic substances such as dioxin, foreign objects in products (e.g., syringe needles from
treatments), bacterial contamination, feeding of restricted ingredients (e.g., animal by-products in
the case of BSE).
Anonymity in which transactions occur in the open market limits the ability of upstream ￿rms
to drive unveri￿able e⁄orts and actions in a context of con￿ icting interests. E⁄orts have been
undertaken to reduce anonymity by implementing production protocols, information technology and
supply chain management processes to improve identi￿cation of products and suppliers throughout
the supply chain. This complex process is referred to as traceability.
The implementation of a traceability system does not imply direct interventions in procedures
and processes in the production to improve quality controls already in place. Yet some changes may
be necessary, for instance limitations on product mixing may be needed for segregating output and
thus preserve its origin identity (Antle, 2001). The International Organization for Standardization
(ISO) points out that a traceability system just creates capability for the retrieval of the history,
use or location of a product and activity or process through a registered identi￿cation (EAN.UCC,
2003). Therefore a traceability system is just an information system.
Traceability systems have been used as a tool to accomplish predetermined objectives regarding
security improvement, quality control, fraud detection, ful￿llment of consumer demands, compliance
with international market standards and management of complex logistical chains (EAN Interna-
tional, 2003; Moe, 1998). Therefore, ￿rms and government agencies ￿rst look at their predetermined
objectives, the costs and bene￿ts of available traceability systems and then determine the type of
traceability system in terms of its breadth, depth and precision1.
This article studies a traceability system that, with certain average traceback rate of success,
maintains the identity of fed cattle suppliers attached to the meat being processed. This traceability
system allows for linking problems which may occur at a downstream stage of production to the
origin of the raw material. By doing so, this traceability system makes it feasible for a downstream
￿rm to create and use incentive mechanisms. These incentive mechanisms are employed as a manner
of driving actions to be undertaken by upstream ￿rms. We ￿rst study the optimal level of expected
traceback of success a traceability system should have to e¢ ciently create incentive mechanisms.
Second, we inquire into the economic value of this type of traceability system. The illustrative
example of injection site lesions in beef production is used to examine the optimal expected traceback
rate of success and the economic value of a beef traceability system from the slaughter ￿ oor to the
fabrication ￿ oor in a meat packing plant in the US.
Research related to the e⁄ect of information asymmetry on food safety and quality seems to have
developed in two directions: (1) works to study the e⁄ect of using a noisy grading or testing technology
to infer producers￿behaviors regarding their investment in product quality (adverse selection issue),
1Breadth is the amount of information recorded by the system, depth de￿nes how far backward and forward
traceability is maintained, and precision represents the system￿ s ability to pinpoint the original source of a problem
(Golan et al., 2004).
1(2) works to inquire into the e⁄ect of using a noisy grading or testing technology as a tool to create
incentive mechanisms driving the level of e⁄ort put by producers on product quality and safety. The
second group of works often apply the Pricipal-Agent (hereafter referred to as PA) framework.
As examples of the ￿rst group of works, Hennessy (1995) constructs a conceptual model wherein,
by assumption, food processors test raw material supplied by producers as a method to protect
their reputations in the consumer marketplace. Using this model, he shows that a price-grade type
incentive is incapable of producing a market equilibrium wherein the ￿rst-best level of investment
in quality by producers is attained. According to his model, sampling and measurement errors in
the testing and grading are the reason for this to happen. As a solution to the underinvestment in
quality by producers, he advocates that processors and producers will vertically integrate or source
via product contracts. Along this same line of reasoning, Chalfant et al. (1999) argue that imperfect
veri￿cation of quality may be mitigated by grading. However, incentives based on an imperfect grade
will not be strong enough to induce producers to incur ￿rst-best investments in higher value product.
The reason for this is that incentives to produce high quality raw material are lowered because grading
a lower quality product as being of higher quality (type II error in grading) is a feasible event. In
fact, this is the same explanation previously given by Hennessy (1995). Also Bogetoft and Olesen
(2003) study the e⁄ect of using a noisy grading technology to infer producers￿behaviors regarding
investing in product quality. They show that the results obtained by Hennessy (1995) and Chalfant
et al. (1999) hold only for a perfectly competitive market structure where trade occurs after grading
(a posteriori competition) but does not necessarily hold for a competitive setting where all trade
occurs before grading (a priori competition).
As examples of the second group of works, Dubois and Vukina (2004) adapt the closed form
solution for a PA model with linear contracts, normally distributed measurement errors and Agent￿ s
exponential utility to econometrically estimate farmers￿degree of risk aversion in contracting pro-
duction of hogs. Their results give empirical evidence that Agent￿ s degree of risk aversion constrain
the set of possible incentive mechanisms to be o⁄ered by the Principal to Agents as predicted by
the PA model. Starbird (2005) examines the e⁄ect of inspection policies set by the Principal on
the e⁄orts exerted by producers (Agents) concerning product safety. His ￿ndings support the idea
that inspection policies are e⁄ective tools for improving food safety. King, Backus and Gaag (2004)
develop and apply a dynamic principal-agent model for salmonella control in pork production in the
Netherlands. By their model the Principal o⁄ers a contract to the Agent specifying the frequency
at which the Agent￿ s hogs will be tested on delivery, the share of the expected testing cost paid by
producer, and the level of penalty per hog for a salmonella prevalence test that exceeds a tolerance
level pre-de￿ned by the Principal. The Agent may in￿ uence the salmonella prevalence in his/her
hogs by adopting salmonella control packages that are more costly the more it reduces the expected
prevalence level. Also, the Agent￿ s salmonella control package choices a⁄ect his/her reputation over
time and consequently the frequency at which the Agent￿ s hogs will be tested. This feature gives the
dynamic aspect in this study. The main contribution of this paper is to show that reputation-based
contracts a⁄ect Agents￿behavior.
A common characteristic of all those studies previously mentioned is that, at the time a signal
correlated with an Agent￿ s action is observed, the Principal knows the Agent￿ s identity. This is
certainly the case when raw material is tested on delivery. However, once the processing of the raw
material starts, unobservable characteristics on its delivery may become observable. But at this
time, the identity of the raw material supplier is likely to have been de￿nitively separated from the
processed product. This is exactly the case for injection-site lesions in meat. Because lesions can only
be observed after processing cattle into beef, no incentive mechanism can be created if the identity
of fed cattle suppliers is systematically separated from carcasses during their processing.
Management-related quality problems such as injection-site blemishes still cause losses for the
beef industry in the US. Beef cattle are given injections of biological or antibiotic compounds at
various stages of their lives to prevent disease and facilitate recovery from illness (Field and Taylor,
22004). When given intramuscularly these injections may cause tissue damage.
Results of the National Beef Quality Audit in 2000 revealed that beef packers believed the greatest
quality improvement since 1991 has been the decreased frequency of injection-site lesions found in
beef top sirloin subprimals (McKenna et al., 2002). Although the incidence of injection-site lesion
defects in top sirloins is at a low record of 2.5%, purveyors and retailers still ranked this as one of the
greatest quality challenges facing the U.S. beef industry. The National Cattlemen￿ s Beef Association
has recommended all injections, regardless of age, be moved to the neck and that subcutaneous
injections be administered when allowable (Morgan, Tittor and Lloyd, 2004). However large muscle
masses of the rear quarters provides a better target than the neck and animals do not need to be
restrained if it is not necessary to inject a precise location (Hilton, 2005).
At the meat packer, carcasses are reduced into many beef products and like cuts from di⁄erent
carcasses are commingled to create consistent boxes of beef cuts and products. Hence, the direct
tracking of products back to an individual animal and feedlot of origin is very di¢ cult (Robb and
Rosa, 2004). Injection-site lesions remain concealed within the muscles and subcutaneous fat which
makes damage observable only during portioning of the primal cuts (Roeber et al., 2001). At this
time, the identity of fed cattle supplier and animal ID are likely to have been detached from the
primal cuts. Therefore, there may be an economic incentive for a meat packer to use a traceability
system to trace injection-site lesions back to the animal and feedlot of origin. This article addresses
this issue by examining the economic value and optimal traceback rate of success of a beef traceability
system from the slaughter ￿ oor to the fabrication ￿ oor in a meat packing plant.
The Context for the Principal-Agent Game with a Traceabil-
ity System in Place
An injection-site lesion is fully characterized by the beef retail cut being damaged. Three types of
injection-site lesions may be observed: an injection-site lesion in the top sirloin butt, an injection-site
lesion in the round and an injection-site lesion in the chuck steak. Feedlot owners may a⁄ect the
type and frequency of injection-site lesion occurring in carcasses. Basically, a feedlot owner has three
mutually exclusive actions to undertake. He/she may choose to give all injections in the rear leg,
or in the neck area of an animal, or to use a needle-free technique regardless of the area. Based on
how costly each action is, the order of preferences for the actions available to the feedlot owner is: to
give all injections in the rear quarters is preferred to give all injections in the neck area, and to give
all injections in the neck area is preferred to give all injections with a needle-free technique. On the
other hand, according to the market value of beef retail cuts the meat packer prefers no injection-site
lesions rather than injection-site lesions in chuck steak and injection-site lesions in chuck steak rather
than injection-site lesions in top sirloin and round. Therefore, the order of preferences for the meat
packers and feedlot owners are diametrically opposite which characterizes the con￿ icting interests
between meat packers and feedlot owners in the present setting.
Injection-site lesions in cattle are concealed within the muscles and subcutaneous fat which makes
damage observable only during portioning of the primal cuts (Roeber et al., 2001). In a typical
meat packing plant, batches of carcass are broken down into primals, sub-primals and retail cuts at
fabrication ￿ oor (Robb and Rosa, 2004). A traceability system in place makes it possible, with certain
probability of success, that the identity of the fed cattle supplier and animal ID are still attached
to the beef retail cuts when injection-site lesion damage is observed. Thus, a traceability system is
added from the slaughter ￿ oor to the fabrication ￿ oor (traceability system￿ s depth) in a typical meat
packing plant. Information on a unique 20 digit animal ID number encoded in an electronic button
tag is read on cattle delivery and stored by the traceability system. After a carcass is processed into
sides, each carcass￿side is individually identi￿ed with a lot and sequence number representing the
order in which the electronic ID numbers were read (kill order). There is a rail for each carcass￿side.
3The traceability database system stores data on lot number, kill order, animal electronic ID number
and the identity of fed cattle supplier (traceability system￿ s breadth). Failures are expected to occur
due to hardware and software breakdown and incompatibility, plant logistic and electromagnetic
interferences with the Radio Frequency ID readers (Basarab, Milligan and Thorlakson, 1997). Hence
the traceability system￿ s precision is 100% whenever the system works properly, otherwise zero.
The Principal-Agent Game with a Traceability System in
Place
A meat packer (Principal) purchases live animals from a group of homogeneous growers (Agents)
indexed by i = 1;:::;n to run a one-time project. Agent i undertakes actions that a⁄ect the frequency
and type of injection-site damages in beef retail cuts. More speci￿cally, an action ai undertaken by
Agent i belongs to the action space de￿ned as Ai and are unveri￿able by the time transactions take
place. For the case study with injection-site lesions in cattle the action space will comprise three
actions as Ai = fTo give all injections in the rear leg, To give all injections in the neck area, To give
all injections with a needle-free techniqueg.
The average rate by which a traceability system works, in terms of tracing back injection-site
damage to the animal and fed cattle supplier, determines the expected traceback rate of success
and fully characterizes a traceability system. Thus, the expected traceback rate of success from the
slaughter ￿ oor to the fabrication ￿ oor gives the system￿ s degree of reliability.
The two-stage sequential game with complete2 and perfect information3 played by the Principal
and each Agent i runs as follows (see Figure 1). First, the expected traceback rates of success for
the beef traceability system is set and announced to the Agents by the Principal; also, contingent
income transfers are accorded. Second, the Principal and the Agent agree on the terms of a future
transaction, even if a formal agreement or legal contract is not signed. Third, Agent i undertakes
actions regarding the production of injection-site lesions in cattle and delivers fed cattle to the
Principal. Fourth, injection-site lesions are observed or are not observed during beef processing
and packing. Also, the traceability system works or does not work along the cattle processing and
packing. Fifth, contingent payments are made.






























2Players￿payo⁄ functions are common knowledge (see Gibbons, 1992).
3It means that at each move in the game the player with the move knows the full history of the game thus far
(Gibbons, 1992: p.55). By the time an Agent moves he/she knows the expected traceability rate of success and also
the contingent payment scheme.
4The Model for the PA Game with a Traceability System
Every feasible event is de￿ned for a carcass￿side, assuming that what happens with a carcass￿side is
independent of what happens with the other carcass￿side of an animal. Therefore, the ￿nal expected
cost per head is just twice as much as the cost per carcass￿side. In a setting wherein there is a
traceability system in place and three types of injection-site lesions, the sample space comprises
sixteen feasible events de￿ned as follows.
De￿nition 1 A collection of 4-tuples composes the sample space for the asymmetric information
setting with traceability E = f(z1;z2;z3;z4) : z1 = 0 or 1;z2 = 0 or 1;z3 = 0 or 1;z4 = 0 or 1g:
Where z1 equals 1 if the traceability system works, otherwise 0; z2 equals 1 if a lesion in a top sirloin
butt is observed, otherwise 0; z3 equals 1 if a lesion in a bottom-round is observed, otherwise 0; z4
equals 1 if a lesion in chuck steak is observed, otherwise 0.
The Principal task is to set contingent income transfers as $ per carcass￿side so that an incentive
mechanism is created and o⁄ered to each Agent. Thus, let v(z1;z2;z3;z4) be the income transfer to
Agent i as $ per carcass￿side contingent on the event (z1;z2;z3;z4) 2 E occurring.
A meat packer has no means of making contingent transfers to a feedlot owner based on the
observed injection-site damage whenever the traceability system does not work. The reason for this
is that it will be impossible to traceback the injection-site lesion damage to the animal and to the
feedlot of origin. This will be the case for these eight feasible events (0;0;0;0), (0;0;0;1), (0;0;1;0),
(0;0;1;1), (0;1;0;0), (0;1;0;1), (0;1;1;0) and (0;1;1;1). Thus, let I0 be the income transfer to the
Agent as $ per carcass￿side whenever the traceability system does not work (contingency 0).
On the other hand income transfers to Agents contingent on observed injection-site lesion damage
become feasible whenever the traceability system works. These contingent income transfers to Agent
i as $ per carcass￿side are de￿ned as follows. I1 ￿ v(1;0;0;0) is the income transfer when no
injection-site lesion damage is observed (contingency 1); I2 ￿ v(1;0;0;1) is the income transfer when
at least one injection-site lesion in chuck steak is observed (contingency 2); I3 ￿ v(1;0;1;0) is the
income transfer when at least one injection-site lesion in bottom-round is observed (contingency 3);
I4 ￿ v(1;0;1;1) is the income transfer when at least one injection-site lesion is observed in bottom-
round and chuck steak (contingency 4); I5 ￿ v(1;1;0;0) is the income transfer when one injection-site
lesion in top sirloin butt is observed (contingency 5); I6 ￿ v(1;1;0;1) is the income transfer when
at least one injection-site lesion is observed in top sirloin butt and chuck steak (contingency 6); I7
￿ v(1;1;1;0) is the income transfer when at least one injection-site lesion is observed in top sirloin
butt and bottom-round (contingency 7); I8 ￿ v(1;1;1;1) is the income transfer when at least one
injection-site lesion is observed in top sirloin butt, bottom-round and chuck steak (contingency 8).
The probabilities of a success event for each random variable in the model are given as follows.
s ￿ F1(z1 = 1) is the probability that the traceability system works in terms of preserving animal
ID and the identity of fed cattle supplier attached to beef retail cuts; F2(ai) ￿ F2(z2 = 1jai) is
the probability that at least one injection-site lesion in a top sirloin butt is observed given Agent i
undertook action ai 2 Ai; F3(ai) ￿ F3(z3 = 1jai) is the probability that at least one injection-site
lesion in a bottom-round is observed given Agent i undertook action ai 2 Ai; and F4(ai) ￿ F4(z4 =
1jai) is the probability that at least one injection-site lesion in chuck steak is observed given Agent
i undertook action ai 2 Ai.
Probabilities of Events in which the Traceability System Does not Work
Assuming every random variable is independent from each other, the probabilities of occurrence for
each feasible event in which the traceability system does not work for a carcass￿side are given as
follow. P(0;0;0;0) = (1￿s)(1￿F2(ai))(1￿F3(ai))(1￿F4(ai)) is the probability that no injection-site
lesion occurs; P(0;0;0;1) = (1 ￿ s)(1 ￿ F2(ai))(1 ￿ F3(ai))F4(ai) is the probability that at least one
5injection-site lesion is observed in chuck steak; P(0;0;1;0) = (1 ￿ s)(1 ￿ F2(ai))F3(ai)(1 ￿ F4(ai))
is the probability that at least one injection-site lesion is observed in bottom-round; P(0;0;1;1) =
(1￿s)(1￿F2(ai))F3(ai)F4(ai) is the probability that at least one injection-site lesion is observed in
bottom-round and chuck steak; P(0;1;0;0) = (1￿s)F2(ai)(1￿F3(ai))(1￿F4(ai)) is the probability
that at least one injection-site lesion is observed in top sirloin butt; P(0;1;0;1) = (1 ￿ s)F2(ai)(1 ￿
F3(ai))F4(ai) is the probability that at least one injection-site lesion is observed in top sirloin butt and
chuck steak; P(0;1;1;0) = (1￿s)F2(ai)F3(ai)(1￿F4(ai)) is the probability that at least one injection-
site lesion is observed in top sirloin butt and bottom-round; P(0;1;1;1) = (1 ￿ s)F2(ai)F3(ai)F4(ai)
is the probability that at least one injection-site lesion is observed in chuck steak, in bottom-round
and in top sirloin butt;
Finally, the probability that the contingency 0; de￿ned as when the traceability system does
not work, is given by: P0 ￿ P(0;0;0;0) + P(0;0;0;1) + P(0;0;1;0) + P(0;0;1;1) + P(0;1;0;0) +
P(0;1;0;1) + P(0;1;1;0) + P(0;1;1;1)
Probabilities of Events in which the Traceability System Works
The probabilities of events in which the traceability system works and income transfer Im is granted
to Agent i are given as follows. P1 = s(1 ￿ F2(ai))(1 ￿ F3(ai))(1 ￿ F4(ai)) is the probability that no
injection-site lesion occurs; P2 = s(1 ￿ F2(ai))(1 ￿ F3(ai))F4(ai) is the probability that at least one
injection-site lesion is observed in chuck steak; P3 = s(1￿F2(ai))F3(ai)(1￿F4(ai)) is the probability
that at least one injection-site lesion is observed in bottom-round; P4 = s(1 ￿ F2(ai))F3(ai)F4(ai) is
the probability that at least one injection-site lesion is observed in bottom-round and chuck steak;
P5 = sF2(ai)(1 ￿ F3(ai))(1 ￿ F4(ai)) is the probability that at least one injection-site lesion is
observed in top sirloin butt; P6 = sF2(ai)(1 ￿ F3(ai))F4(ai) is the probability that at least one
injection-site lesion is observed in top sirloin butt and chuck steak; P7 = sF2(ai)F3(ai)(1￿F4(ai)) is
the probability that at least one injection-site lesion is observed in top sirloin butt and bottom-round;
P8 ￿ sF2(ai)F3(ai)F4(ai) is the probability that at least one injection-site lesion is observed in chuck
steak, in bottom-round and in top sirloin butt.
Second-Best Expected Cost per Head to the Principal Using a Traceability System
Having previously de￿ned all the necessary terms, the second-best expected cost per head to the
Principal is given by (1).
E
SB
c (s;I0;:::;I8jai) = 2[P0I0 + P(0;0;0;1)pc + P(0;0;1;0)pr + P(0;0;1;1)(pc + pr)+
+P(0;1;0;0)ps + P(0;1;0;1)(ps + pc) + P(0;1;1;0)(ps + pr)+
+P(0;1;1;1)(ps + pr + pc) + P1I1 + P2(I2 + pc) + P3(I3 + pr)+
+P4(I4 + pc + pr) + P5(I5 + ps) + P6(I6 + ps + pc)+
+P7(I7 + ps + pr) + P8(I8 + ps + pr + pc)] + g(s) (1)
where g(s) gives the cost as $ per head to trace an animal through a meat packing plant as a
function of s 2 S. Where s is the expected probability of success of preserving information on an
animal ID and its supplier identity attached to beef retail cuts.; pc 2 <+ is the opportunity cost of
an injection-site lesion occurring in chuck steak as $ per carcass￿side; pr 2 <+ is the opportunity
cost of an injection-site lesion occurring in bottom-round as $ per carcass￿side; and ps 2 <+ is the
opportunity cost of an injection-site lesion occurring in top sirloin butt as $ per carcass￿side.
6Expected Utility Function
Agents are homogeneous. Therefore, it is enough to set the utility function for one representative
Agent. According to the crucial assumption in the model proposed by Grossman and Hart (1983:
p.10) Agent i￿ s utility function U : <2 ! < must be set as (2).
(2) U(Im;ai) = k(ai)u(Im) ￿ d(ai)
where Im is the income transfer as $ per carcass￿side from the Principal to Agent i in contingency
m 2 f0;1;::;8g; and k(:) and d(:) are real-valued, continuous functions de￿ned for ai 2 Ai.
Grossman and Hart (1983) points out that to obtain a well behaved problem the real-valued
function u(:) must be strictly increasing, continuously di⁄erentiable and concave on the open interval
(I;+1) with lim
Im!I
u(Im) = ￿1 that implies the Inada condition4 lim
Im!I
u0(Im) = 1. They also
assume that k(:) and d(:) are real-valued, continuous function de￿ned on the action space and that
k(:) is strictly positive.
Given an incentive mechanism set by the Principal as a 10-tuple (s;I0;::;I8), Agent i￿ s expected
utility per carcass￿side for every action ai 2 Ai is given by (3).
(3) U(aijs;I0;::;I8) =
X8
m=0 Pmk(ai)u(Im) ￿ d(ai) 8ai 2 Ai
The Program for the Principal-Agent Model with Traceability
The Principal￿ s problem is to determine (s;I0;::;I8) for each level of b ai 2 Ai and then to select the
action to be undertaken by Agent i￿ s such that the overall minimum expected cost is obtained. In this
way, the incentive mechanism (s;I0;::;I8) should be such that it is going to be Agent￿ s best interest
to undertake the action chosen by the Principal. In the same fashion of the article by Grossman and
Hart (1983), this problem is set as a two-step optimization procedure as follows.
First step: To solve the program (4) for each combination between b ai 2 Ai and s 2 S. This





c (s;I0;::;I8jb ai) for every b ai ￿ s (4a)
Subject to:
X8
m=0 Pmk(ai)u(Im) ￿ d(b ai) ￿ U (4b)
X8
m=0 Pmk(b ai)u(Im) ￿ d(b ai) ￿
X8
m=0 P￿mk(ai)u(Im) ￿ d(ai)8 ai 2 Ai (4c)
where U denotes Agent i￿ s opportunity utility level associated with the best option available to
trade a carcass￿side5; Pm is the probability of each contingency m occurring calculated for a given
action b ai; P￿m denotes the probability of contingency m for each feasible action other than b ai; The
individual rationality or participation constraint is given by (4b); Finally, the incentive compatibility
constraints are set as (4c). In our model, because the action space Ai is composed of three actions,
two incentive compatibility constraints are necessary to be set (4).
With s and b ai ￿xed at some level, the probabilities become constants or parameters for the model.
Therefore, the constraint set is determined by the intersection of convex equations that assures a
4See MacLeod (2003: p.218-19).
5For instance, U may be thought of as the level of utility Agent i can get by trading with a meat packer that does
not use a traceability system and pays, in every contingency, the price given by the market equilibrium.
7convex opportunity set for the program (4). Further, the objective function (4a) is linear in I0;::;I8.
All of these characteristics together leads the program (4) to be a typical convex programming
program. Therefore, if there exists a vector I0;::;I8 that solves program (4), then it generates a
global minimum.
To facilitate the numerical resolution of the program (4), the participation constraint and incentive
compatibility constraints are set in terms of certainty equivalent. Therefore, constraints (4b) and
(4c) are respectively reset as (5) and (6).
v(
X8
m=0 Pmk(ai)u(Im) ￿ d(b ai)) ￿ v(U) (5)
v(
X8
m=0 Pmk(b ai)u(Im) ￿ d(b ai)) ￿ v(
X8
m=0 P￿mk(ai)u(Im) ￿ d(ai))8 ai 2 Ai (6)
where v(:) denotes the inverse function of the utility function u(:).
The Second step consists of choosing, among those results obtained with the ￿rst step, the one
that leads to the overall minimum expected costs per carcass￿side to the Principal.
The Model for the Full Information Setting
Under the full information every action undertaken by Agent i is fully and freely veri￿able by the
Principal. Therefore contracts can be made on Agents￿actions and the Principal has no incentive to
use a traceability system as conceptualized in the present article. The reason is that there is a cost
of imposing risk on Agents. This cost comes from the need of paying risk-premiums for risk averse
Agents to get them to accept a risky contract. Therefore, if Agents￿actions are veri￿able it will be
cheaper for the Principal to contract on Agents￿actions than to condition payments on injection-site
lesions occurring. By doing so, the Principal will avoid paying risk-premiums to Agents, and also will
avoid costs incurred with a traceability system use. Summing up, the traceability system becomes
unnecessary in the full information context.
De￿nition 2 A collection of 3-tuples composes the full information setting sample space de￿ned as
EFB = f(z2;z3;z4) : z2 = 0 or 1;z3 = 0 or 1;z4 = 0 or 1g where z2 is 1 if a lesion in a top sirloin
butt is observed, otherwise 0; z3 is 1 if a lesion in a bottom-round is observed, otherwise 0; and z4 is
1 if a lesion in a chuck steak is observed, otherwise 0.
The sample space for the full information setting comprises eight events. Their probabilities of
occurrence for a carcass￿side are given as follows. P(0;0;0) = (1 ￿ F2(ai))(1 ￿ F3(ai))(1 ￿ F4(ai))
is the probability that no injection-site lesion is observed; P(0;0;1) = (1￿F2(ai))(1￿F3(ai))F4(ai)
is the probability that at least one injection-site lesion is observed in chuck steak; P(0;1;0) =
(1 ￿ F2(ai))F3(ai)(1 ￿ F4(ai)) is the probability that at least one injection-site lesion is observed in
bottom-round; P(0;1;1) = (1￿F2(ai))F3(ai)F4(ai) is the probability that at least one injection-site
lesion is observed in bottom-round and chuck steak; P(1;0;0) = F2(ai)(1 ￿ F3(ai))(1 ￿ F4(ai)) is
the probability that at least one injection-site lesion is observed in top sirloin butt; P(1;0;1) =
F2(ai)(1 ￿ F3(ai))F4(ai) is the probability that at least one injection-site lesion is observed in top
sirloin butt and chuck steak; P(1;1;0) = F2(ai)F3(ai)(1￿F4(ai)) is the probability that at least one
injection-site lesion is observed in top sirloin butt and bottom-round; P(1;1;1).￿ F2(ai)F3(ai)F4(ai)
is the probability that at least one injection-site lesion is observed in chuck steak, in bottom-round
and in top sirloin butt;




c (xFBjai) = 2[IFB + P(0;0;1)pc + P(0;1;0)pr + P(0;1;1)(pc + pr) + P(1;0;0)ps +
+P(1;0;1)(ps + pc) + P(1;1;0)(ps + pr) + P(1;1;1)(ps + pr + pc)] (7)
where IFB is the income the meat packer will transfer to Agent i if the action ai is observed.
The ￿rst-best PA model is solved with a two-step optimization procedure as follows.





c (IFBjai) for every ai 2 Ai (8a)
Subject to:
k(ai)u(IFB) ￿ d(ai) ￿ U (8b)
Since u(:) is strictly increasing in IFB, EFB
c (IFBjai) is also strictly increasing in IFB. Therefore,
the Principal o⁄ers an income transfer for each action ai that just guarantees that the Agent￿ s
reservation utility is obtained. In other words, the participation constraint (8b) always binds. This
result, jointly with the assumption on the behavior of the utility function u(:), will imply that the






Having found the value of u(I￿
FB) it is straightforward to calculate the income to transfer to the






Second step: to choose among ai 2 Ai the action that leads to the overall minimum expected
cost for the Principal.
The Model for the Principal-Agent Game without Traceabil-
ity
Without a traceability system being used, information on the identity of the fed cattle supplier and
animal ID is detached from carcasses along their disassembly and fabrication. Therefore, without
this information it becomes impossible for the Principal to create incentive mechanisms based on the
observed injection-site lesion damage. Hence, the only alternative left to the Principal is to o⁄er a
constant transfer per head to Agent i. Because the Principal wants to minimize his/her costs he/she
o⁄ers to pay exactly the value of the equilibrium price in the fed cattle market to Agent i. As a
result Agent i will undertake the least costly action for him/her. Ultimately, the expected cost per
head for the Principal that is not using a traceability system (EWT
c ) is given by (11).
E
WT
c (Ujai) = 2[v(U) + P(0;0;1)pc + P(0;1;0)pr + P(0;1;1)(pc + pr) + P(1;0;0)ps +
+P(1;0;1)(ps + pc) + P(1;1;0)(ps + pr) + P(1;1;1)(ps + pr + pc)] (11)
where v(U) stands for the market value of a carcass￿side; The remaining terms determine the
expected cost of the negative externality created with injection-site lesion damage and is fully borne
by the Principal that does not use a traceability system.
9The ￿rst-best solution for the injection-site lesion case study is compared with the second-best









c is the expected cost per head obtained for the second-best without traceability, and
ESB￿
c is the overall minimum expected cost per head obtained for the second-best with traceability;
EFB￿
c is the overall minimum expected cost per head obtained for the ￿rst-best problem.
The value obtained with (12) gives the cost of living in a world with asymmetric information as $
per head. This also gives the "Agency Costs" due to the separation of ownership and management. In
the present context, the meat packer delegates the management of the feedlot to fed cattle suppliers.
The Agency Cost is in theory mitigated by the use of incentive mechanisms and eliminated either
by the meat packer buying the feedlot or vice versa (vertical integration).







c is the expected cost for the second-best case without traceability as $ per head; and
ESB￿
c is the overall minimum expected cost for the second-best model with traceability as $ per head.
Parameterizing and Calibrating the Models
Numerical exercises are conducted using the multiplicative separable utility functions (see Grossman
and Hart, 1983: p.38) set by making k(ai) = ekca, u(Im) = ￿e￿kIm, and d(ai) = 0. Thus, the
multiplicative separable utility function is given as (14).
(14) U(Im;ai) = ￿e
￿k(Im￿ca) with k > 0
where k is the coe¢ cient of constant risk aversion.
By this utility functional form, the cost of e⁄ort appears just as negative income. Grossman and
Hart (1983) uses this utility functional form to study the e⁄ect of the Agent￿ s degree of risk aversion
on the loss to the Principal from being unable to observe the Agent￿ s action. The advantage of using
(14) is that an increase in risk aversion can be represented simply by an increase in k. Further,
treating e⁄ort as negative income makes the resulting contract easier to interpret (Haubrich, 1994).
Cost of Actions and Reservation Utility
First of all an injection yields two outcomes: a healthier animal and a potential injection-site lesion.
Since the focus in this study is on the injection-site lesion case, we ignore the costs of producing a
healthier animal and focus instead on the costs of causing an injection-site lesion. Table 1 summarizes
the costs of the actions available to feedlot owners to undertake (see more details in Resende Filho,
2006).
The level of an Agent￿ s reservation utility (U) is calculated assuming that an average carcass
weighs 787 pounds and is sold at $1:22 a pound (Roeber et al. 2000: p. 94). Therefore, a feedlot
owner has a risk-free alternative of selling a carcass￿side in the fed cattle market at $480. The level
of an Agent￿ s reservation utility (U) is calculated using this value.




($ per carcass’s side)
To give all injections in the rear leg 0
To move all injections to the neck area 0.17
To give all injections with a needle-free technique 0.204
Source: Based on Dee Griffin (2005).
Expected Frequency of Injection-Site Lesions in Beef Retail Cuts
Any intramuscular injection results in tissue irritation and scaring (Field and Taylor, 2004). However,
it is not the case that every injection will with certainty cause a future lesion. Because a production
function relating injections to lesions is not available, it is used observed frequencies of lesions at
meat processing plant.
Based on Dee Gri¢ n (2002), the average frequency of injection-site lesions in the chuck steak is
set as 17:5%. It means that a meat packer that uses the market to buy all his/her raw material
should expect that 17:5% of the chuck steaks fabricated in his/her plant will present at least one
injection-site lesion. Relying on Roeber et al. (2000), we set the frequency by which injection-site
lesions occurs in top sirloin butt as 2:5% and in bottom-round as 11:3%. Finally, the probability of
a needle-free technology causing any type of injection-site lesion is set as zero (see Morgan, Tittor
and Lloyd, 2004).
One may argue that the feedlot owner may choose not to give any injection, eliminating any
chance of injection-site lesion. However, by not using a preventive vaccination program expected
losses from animal diseases are assumed to be much higher than the costs of adopting a needle-free
technique. Therefore, not giving injections at all is assumed to be a strictly dominated strategy for
Agent i.
Opportunity Cost of Damaged Beef Retail Cuts
We use the same procedure employed by Roeber et al. (2000: p. 98-100) to estimate the expected
loss with injection-site lesions per side of a fed steer and heifer harvested in 2000. Thus, we ￿nd that
ps = $11:02 is the opportunity cost of an injection-site lesion occurring in top sirloin butt as $ per
carcass￿side; pr = $9:91 is the opportunity cost of an injection-site lesion occurring in bottom-round
as $ per carcass￿side; and pc = $2:5 is the opportunity cost of an injection-site lesion occurring in
chuck steak as $ per carcass￿side.
Expected Traceback Rates of Success and their Costs
Values for expected traceback rates of success are taken from experiments carried out by Basarab,
Milligan and Thorlakson (1997) with traceability systems like those under analysis in this study.
The expected traceback rates of success respectively for the traceability system 1, 2 and 3 are set
as S = f38:9%;43:7%;95%g. Therefore, a traceability system is fully characterized by its expected
traceback rate of success.
Because there is no information linking those expected traceback rate of success with costs, we
use a common cost functional form used in the PA literature (Prendergast, 1999) to represent the
relation between traceability cost per head and expected traceback rate of success as follows:
(15) g(s) = ￿s2
2
where g(s) is the cost of tracing two carcass￿sides from the slaughter ￿ oor to the fabrication ￿ oor in
a meat packing plant with an expected traceback rate of success s; and ￿ 2 <++ is a constant.
11We model a small-sized meat packing plant slaughtering 800 head per day with a Radio Frequency
ID solution for each rail (one rail per each carcass￿side) which leads to a traceability cost of $0:11
per head (Pape et al., 2003). We assume that $0:11 per head is the cost of a traceability system
with a 38:9% expected traceback rate of success per head. We plug these values into equation
(15) to calculate ￿ = 2 ￿ 0:11=0:3892 = 1:4539. Finally, plugging each element of the set S into
g(s) = 1:4539s2=2 yields the values presented in the third column of Table 2.
Table 2: Expected Traceback Rate of Success and their Costs













Source: Expected traceback rates were observed by Basarab, Milligan and Thorlakson (1997);
Costs are based on Pape et al. (2003) estimates.
Methods and Procedures to Solve the Models
Numerical solutions for the PA model with traceability are obtained using macros built with Visual
Basic for Applications linking Microsoft Excel and Microsoft Excel Solver. The nonlinear convex
programs (4) are numerically solved with the Microsoft Excel Solver using the Generalized Reduced
Gradient (GRG2) nonlinear optimization code. The solution for the First-Best program (8) is ana-
lytically obtained by solving equation (9) for each Agent￿ s action. With these results, it is calculated
income transfers as given by (10) and the minimum ￿rst-best cost as given by (7). These calculations
are also executed in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet for each feasible action of Agent i.
Scenario Analysis and Discussion
In this article, we present the baseline scenario taken from a bigger study conducted by Resende
Filho (2006), as a means of exemplifying how our models work. This scenario study is also enough
to show one of the key results obtained in that study. The baseline scenario is constructed for agents
with coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion set equal to 1:125 as also used by Haubrich (1994: p. 264).
Baseline Scenario
The baseline scenario for the Principal-Agent Model is characterized by feedlot owners being able
to a⁄ect 75% of the ultimate expected frequency of injection-site lesions. Because part of the cattle
production occurs in the cow-calf stage, the remaining 25% of the expected frequencies comes from
this stage of production. Table 3 gives the expected frequency of injection-site lesion for each Agent￿ s
action. Details on how those frequencies are obtained can be found in Resende Filho (2006).
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Source: Based on Roeber et al. (2000), Dee Griffin (2002) and Morgan, Tittor and Lloyd (2004).
First-Best Results under the Baseline Scenario with the Coe¢ cient of
Absolute Risk Aversion Set Equal to 1.125
Results obtained by solving the ￿rst-best program (8) are shown in Table 4.
Table 4: First-Step Solution to the First-Best Model under the Baseline Scenario with the Coe¢ cient
of Absolute Risk Aversion Set Equal to 1.125
Probability of First-Best Events




(1) 82.6989 3.7836 10.5355 0.4820 2.1205 0.0970 0.2701 0.0124
(2) 79.6683 16.8993 2.3161 0.4913 0.5011 0.1063 0.0146 0.0031




c E : Expected Cost to the Principal
($/head)









Note: (1) denotes the action of giving all injections in the rear leg, (2) refers to the action of giving all
injections in the neck area, and (3) refers to the action of giving all injections with a needle-free technique; *
denotes the overall minimum expected cost to the Principal.
Table 4 shows that the overall minimum expected cost to the Principal (EFB
c = $961:32 per head)
occurs when Agent i gives all injections with a needle-free technique (action 3). Hence, the meat
packer should contract every Agent to give all injections with a needle-free technique by o⁄ering a
￿xed income transfer of $480:20 per carcass￿side. Since $480 is the value of a carcass￿side in the
market, $0:20 per carcass￿side is the price-premium the Principal pays to the Agent as a means of
covering the additional costs the Agent incurs in giving all injections with a needle-free technique
plus a risk-premium.
13As it is a full information setting, if an Agent deviates from the contracted action, the Principal
will know this for sure. For instance, if the Principal contracts an Agent to give all injections with
a needle-free technique and the Agent gives instead all injections in the rear leg, the Principal will
know this and may just pay nothing to the Agent as a punishment. Therefore, the Agent is always
better o⁄ complying with the contract.
Since the meat packer contracts feedlot owners to give all injections with a needle-free technique,
probabilities for each element in the First-Best sample space (EFB) are given as follows (see these
values in Table 4). No injection-site lesion will be observed in 92:3428% of the carcass￿sides; At
least one injection-site lesion will be observed in chuck steak in 4:2248% of the carcass￿sides; At
least one injection-site lesion will be observed in bottom-round in 2:6845% of the carcass￿sides; At
least one injection-site lesion will be observed in bottom-round and chuck steak in 0:1228% of the
carcass￿sides; At least one injection-site lesion will be observed in top sirloin butt in 0:5808% of the
carcass￿sides; At least one injection-site lesion will be observed in top sirloin butt and chuck steak in
0:0266% of the carcass￿sides; At least one injection-site lesion will be observed in top sirloin butt and
bottom-round in 0:0169% of the carcass￿sides; And at least one injection-site lesion will be observed
in chuck steak, in bottom-round and in top sirloin butt in 0:0008% of the carcass￿sides. The reason
for positive probabilities with the needle free injection is that cattle may have been needle injected
at the cow-calf stage.
Second-Best without Traceability: Result under the Baseline Scenario
with the Coe¢ cient of Absolute Risk Aversion Set Equal to 1.125
The equilibrium for the game without traceability is for the Principal to pay the market equilibrium
price $960 per head (fed cattle market price), and for Agent i to give all injections in the rear leg since
this is a zero cost action for him/her to undertake (see Table 1). Since the cost of giving all injections
in the rear leg is zero, the expected costs for the ￿rst-best calculated with equation (7) and for the
second-best without traceability calculated by equation (11) are equal. Therefore, the expected cost
for a meat packer that does not use a traceability system is $963:01 per head as presented in Table
4. Notice that this value is the same as if a meat packer had contracted feedlot owners to give all
injections in the rear leg in a full information setting. Since to give all injections in the rear leg is
the least costly action available to the Agent, there would be no gain for the Agent if he/she deviates
from undertaking this action.
Second-Best with Traceability: Results under the Baseline Scenario with
the Coe¢ cient of Absolute Risk Aversion Set Equal to 1.125
The order of preference with respect to outcomes by the Principal￿ s perspective is contingency 1 ￿
contingency 0 ￿ contingency 2 ￿ contingency 3 ￿ contingency 5 ￿ contingency 4 ￿ contingency 6
￿ contingency 7 ￿ contingency 8. Income transfers (Im) should be higher the more preferred is the
contingency occurring. According to SalaniØ (1997: p.118) this will be the case only if a high action
increases the probability of getting a high outcome at least as much as it increases the probability of
getting a low outcome. This condition is called the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Condition (MLRC)







for all action l;j 2 Ai with action l being more costly to Agents than action j, and for all contingencies
m preferred to ￿m from the Principal￿ s perspective. The results to the MLRC test obtained by
applying 16 showed that the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Conditions do not hold for the baseline
14scenario. To overcome this problem, the following eight additional constraints are imposed to the
program (4) to guarantee that the more preferred the outcome is the higher the income transfer (Im)
will be6:
I1 ￿ I0; I0 ￿ I2; I2 ￿ I3; I3 ￿ I5; I5 ￿ I4; I4 ￿ I6; I6 ￿ I7; I7 ￿ I8
Results obtained by solving the ￿rst-step of the second-best PA model with traceability are
presented in Table 5 and Table 6.
Table 5 shows in the third column the expected costs to the Principal for each combination
between an action by the Agent and an expected traceback rate of success of a traceability system.
The expected costs presented in the third column of Table 5 are the values for the objective function
of the program (4) evaluated at its minimizer for each combination between Agent￿ s action and
traceability system￿ s expected traceback rate of success.
Table 5: First-Step Results to the PA Model with Traceability under the Baseline Scenario with the




















Note: (1) denotes the action of giving all injections in the rear leg, (2) refers to the
action of giving all injections in the neck area, and (3) stands for the action of giving
all injections with a needle-free technique; * denotes the overall minimum expected
cost to the Principal.
The second-step in solving the PA model with traceability consists of choosing the equilibrium
strategies that lead to the overall minimum expected cost to the Principal. From Table 5, $961:47
per head is the overall minimum expected cost that the Principal can obtain. This expected cost
can be obtained if an incentive mechanism can induce the Agent i in his/her best interest to give all
injections with a needle-free technique (action 3). Such an incentive mechanism presented in Table
6 is set as follows.
First, the Principal announces that his/her traceability system will be set a 38:9% of expected
traceback rate of success. This informs Agents that there will be 38:9% chance that their identities
will remain attached to ￿nal beef retail cuts. Therefore, the traceability system with the lowest
expected traceback rate of success among those under analysis is capable of generating an incentive
mechanism strong enough to lead Agents in his/her best interest to give all injections with a needle-
free technology. The role played by the traceability system is to allow for an incentive scheme that
makes the preferred action by the Principal also the preferred action by the Agent. In the present
setting the action to be induced happens to be the action that would have been contracted in a full
information setting.
6We thank Robert P. King for his comments and suggestions regarding this point.
15Second, the Principal announces the income to be transferred to the Agent in each contingency
as $ per carcass￿side. In order to induce Agents to give all injections with a needle-free technique,
$480:23 will be paid to the Agent if the traceability system does not work (contingency 0). For
instance, if the traceability system works then $480:26 will be transferred if no damage is observed
(contingency 1), $479:72 will be transferred if at least one injection-site lesion is observed in chuck
steak (contingency 2) and so on for the rest of results.
Notice that all incentive scheme respect the order of preference regarding the outcomes from
the Principal￿ s perspective (contingency 1 ￿ contingency 0 ￿ contingency 2 ￿ contingency 3 ￿
contingency 5 ￿ contingency 4 ￿ contingency 6 ￿ contingency 7 ￿ contingency 8) since income
transfers (Im) respect the the order given as I1 ￿ I0 ￿ I2 ￿ I3 ￿ I5 ￿ I4 ￿ I6 ￿ I7 ￿ I8.
Table 6: Incentive Mechanisms Obtained with the First-Step Solution to the PA Model with Trace-
ability under the Baseline Scenario with the Coe¢ cient of Absolute Risk Aversion Set Equal to
1.125
Income Transfers










(1) 38.9 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00
(2) 38.9 480.18 480.18 480.18 479.99 479.99 479.99 479.99 475.48 475.48
(3) 38.9 480.23 480.26 479.72 479.72 479.71 479.72 479.71 475.40 475.39
(1) 43.7 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00
(2) 43.7 480.19 480.19 480.19 479.99 479.99 479.99 479.99 475.58 475.58
(3) 43.7 480.23 480.26 479.76 479.76 479.76 479.76 479.76 475.50 475.50
(1) 95.0 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00
(2) 95.0 480.19 480.19 480.19 479.99 479.99 479.99 479.99 476.32 476.32
(3) 95.0 480.22 480.24 479.98 479.98 479.97 479.98 479.97 476.18 476.18
Note: (1) denotes the action of giving all injections in the rear leg, (2) refers to the action of giving all
injections in the neck area, and (3) stands for the action of giving all injections with a needle-free technique.
Because the incentive compatibility constraints are satis￿ed, it will be in the Agents￿best interest
to give all injections with a needle-free technique given such an incentive mechanism. Therefore, the
probability of each contingency m 2 f0;1;:::;8g is shown in Table 7 in the row with Agent￿ s action
3 and expected traceback rate of success of 38:9%. Hence, the Principal will transfer to the agent
$480:23 per carcass side 61.1% of time, $480:26 per carcass side 35.9214% of the time and so on for
the rest of results. Using these values to calculate the expected transfer to Agent i yields $480:22 per
carcass￿side. In other words, the Principal will pay a premium of $0:22 per carcass￿side to get Agents
to accept this incentive mechanism. This price premium is to cover the higher costs the Agent will
incur to give all injections with a needle-free technique and to pay the risk-premium necessary to get
Agents to participate. Further, notice that the income transfers will vary little across contingencies.
This is a sign that the Principal avoids imposing risk on Agents in order to minimize the need for
paying risk premiums to Agents.
The cost of living in a second-best world as given by equation (12) is
minf963:01;961:47g ￿ 961:32 = $0:15 per head
16Table 7: Frequency of Income Transfers to the PA Model with Traceability under the Baseline
Scenario
Probability of Contingency m Occurring
0 P
1 P
2 P 3 P














(1) 38.9 61.1000 32.1699 1.4718 4.0983 0.1875 0.8249 0.0377 0.1051 0.0048
(2) 38.9 61.1000 30.9910 6.5738 0.9009 0.1911 0.1949 0.0413 0.0057 0.0012
(3) 38.9 61.1000 35.9214 1.6435 1.0443 0.0478 0.2259 0.0103 0.0066 0.0003
(1) 43.7 56.3000 36.1394 1.6534 4.6040 0.2106 0.9267 0.0424 0.1181 0.0054
(2) 43.7 56.3000 34.8151 7.3850 1.0121 0.2147 0.2190 0.0464 0.0064 0.0014
(3) 43.7 56.3000 40.3538 1.8463 1.1731 0.0537 0.2538 0.0116 0.0074 0.0003
(1) 95.0 5.0000 78.5639 3.5944 10.0087 0.4579 2.0145 0.0922 0.2566 0.0117
(2) 95.0 5.0000 75.6849 16.0544 2.2003 0.4667 0.4760 0.1010 0.0138 0.0029
(3) 95.0 5.0000 87.7257 4.0136 2.5503 0.1167 0.5517 0.0252 0.0160 0.0007
Note: (1) denotes the action of giving all injections in the rear leg, (2) refers to the action of giving all
injections in the neck area, and (3) stands for the action of giving all injections with a needle-free technique.
Notice that $0:15 per head is incurred because a traceability system has to be in place and price-
premiums have to be paid to Agents. According to Agency Theory, such cost could be avoided if
ownership and management were put together by either the feedlot owner buying the meat packing
plant or vice versa (vertical integration).
The value of traceability calculated using equation (13) is
$963:01 ￿ $961:47 = $1:54 per head
Recall that without a traceability system in place the identity of the cattle suppliers and animal
ID will certainly be lost during carcass fabrication and processing, which will preclude any incentive
mechanism from existing. Thus, the reduction in the losses with injection-site lesions by inducing an
Agent to give all injections with a needle-free technique o⁄sets the costs incurred with a traceability
system, price premiums to compensate Agents for undertaking a more costly action and for Agents
to accept a risky incentive mechanism.
Finally, a meat packing plant processing 800 head per day would save 800 ￿ $1:54 = $1;232 per
day if a traceability system from the slaughter room to the fabrication ￿ oor were in place in a setting
like the baseline scenario with risk averse Agents with coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion equal to
1:125.
Conclusions
Damages from injection-site lesions are still a concern in the beef industry. This study has adapted the
general two-step procedure developed by Grossman and Hart (1983) to model and solve a Principal-
Agent model wherein a meat traceability system is in place to a⁄ect the decision of injection-site
17choice in cattle. This extends the Grossman and Hart (1983) work to make it applicable to a real
case-study.
The objectives of the present work were to investigate the economic value and the optimal ex-
pected traceback rate of success for a traceability system from the slaughter ￿ oor to the fabrication
￿ oor in a meat packing plant. Hence, the conclusions are presented in two blocks as follows.
Regarding the economic value of a traceability system:
It has been found that a meat traceability system may have economic value as a device allowing
for an incentive mechanism to exist. Yet, the incentive mechanisms made feasible with the use of a
traceability system are not expected to o⁄er much di⁄erent income transfers across contingencies. The
Principal chooses not to put much risk on the Agents, therefore avoiding to pay high risk-premiums
to get Agents to participate.
It has been observed that, by allowing the Principal to create and use incentive mechanisms,
a meat traceability system could induce Agents in his/her best interest to undertake the ￿rst-best
action.
Regarding the optimal expected traceback rate of success of the traceability system:
We found that 38.9% is the optimal expected traceback rate of success to be chosen by the
Principal among those considered as feasible in the present study. This is the lowest expected
traceback rate of success among those evaluated in this article. This ￿nding supports the idea that
it is possible for a relatively unreliable traceability system to allow for incentive mechanisms strong
enough to induce feedlot owners in their best interest to undertake the ￿rst-best action.
The Principal-Agent model developed in the present study shows potential to be employed in
studying other problems in which identity preservation is a concern. For instance, our conceptual
model might be adapted to study the case of non point source pollution. To see the similarities with
the injection-site lesion case, suppose that there exist alternative technologies based on markers mak-
ing it possible to trace a type of pollution to an Agent (source). Further, marker based technologies
show di⁄erent costs and expected traceback rate of success. Agents a⁄ect with their actions the type
and the probability of pollution occurring with more costly actions to Agents being preferred actions
from the Principal perspective (con￿ icting nature of the problem). The information asymmetry ex-
ists because monitoring actions undertaken by the Agents is too costly to be economically feasible.
Finally, the Principal seeks to minimize the society￿ s costs with pollution. Since the level of type
of pollution occurring is observable, the Principal wants to be capable of devising incentive mecha-
nisms. Therefore, based on the level of type of pollution occurring and on the expected traceback
rate of success of marker based technology the Principal may create incentive mechanisms to drive
unveri￿able action by Agents.
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